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VIRGINIA IS FOR LhVERA BUSINESS OWNERS WHO FEEL
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION POSES A THREAT TO
THEIR RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES
ABSTRACT
In November 1992, the Arlington County Board voted to add
"sexual orientation" to the group of classes protected under its anti-
discrimination policy. When a store owner was sued for violating this
policy in 2006, he countersued, claiming that Arlington did not have
the power to enact such a policy. His claim was based on the exis-
tence of a strongly state-centered power hierarchy unique to a very
small minority of states, including Virginia, laid out in the Dillon
Rule. Virginia's use of the Dillon Rule basically cripples its munic-
ipal corporations by injecting uncertainty into the process of enacting
local legislation and by making local leaders reticent to enact pro-
gressive measures lest they be challenged or overruled outright. In
effect, this seemingly innocuous and outdated power hierarchy has
stunted civil rights movements, specifically the gay rights movement,
in Virginia and should be eradicated.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 1992, the Arlington County Board voted to add
"sexual orientation" to the group of classes protected under its anti-
discrimination policy.' This measure garnered startlingly little
attention - despite the traditionally conservative political leanings
of Virginians and the increasingly homophobic policies of social con-
servatives in the United States - that is, until May 2006.2 At that
1. See Charles W. Hall, Sexual Orientation Gains Protection in Arlington Law,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1992, at B3.
2. See Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 256 (2006)
(challenging Arlington's power to create an antidiscrimination policy protecting sexual
orientation).
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time, the Arlington Human Rights Commission sued a movie store
owner for discriminating against a homosexual woman who wanted
him to duplicate a video of a gay rights rally.3 The store owner coun-
tersued, claiming that Arlington did not have the power to enact this
law.4
His claim was based on the existence of a strongly state-centered
power hierarchy unique to a very small minority of states, including
Virginia, laid out in the Dillon Rule.5 The Dillon Rule states that "a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise" powers from only
three sources.6 Of course, municipalities have any powers granted
expressly by the state legislature.' The Dillon Rule also allows for the
assumption of powers "necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted,"' through a kind of parallel to the
Necessary and Proper Clause in the enumerated powers listed the
United States Constitution.9 Finally, the Dillon Rule states that
municipalities have all powers that are deemed "essential to the de-
clared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply conve-
nient, but indispensable."1 ° Any "reasonable doubt" as to whether a
municipality has a power should be "resolved by the courts against
the corporation,"1 effectively denying debatable powers.
3. Id. at 257-58.
4. Id. at 258.
5. See Appendix" Home Rule Across the Fifty States, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A
FIFrY-STATE HANDBOOK 471,476-77 (Dale Krane et al. eds., 2001). While other states claim
to utilize the Dillon Rule (including Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, and West Virginia), in practice, all of these states, except for Nevada,
have some form of the Home Rule, meaning that they are either more lax than Virginia
in their interpretation of the Dillon Rule (like in Idaho, where localities have considerable
discretion in creating ordinances) or that they are inconsistent in their application (as
in Alabama, where city governments are allowed considerable power, but county govern-
ments are not). See the following chapters in HOME RULE IN AMERICA: Charles J. Spindler,
Alabama, at 23,24-25; Richard C. Kearney, Connecticut, at 78,79-80; James B. Weatherby,
Idaho, at 120, 121; Dale Krane, Nebraska, at 258, 258; Robert P. Morin & Eric B. Herzik,
Nevada, at 269, 270; James H. Svara, North Carolina, at 312, 313; Kenneth A. Klase,
West Virginia, at 445, 445-60. Although the Dillon Rule was initially widely adopted,
shortly afterwards, states began rapidly abandoning it. Introduction to HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 1, 9-12 (Dale Krane et al. eds., 2001).
6. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 145
(4th ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1881) (emphasis omitted).
7. Id.
8. Id. (emphasis omitted).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power "[tlo make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.").
10. 1 DILLON, supra note 6, at 145.
11. Id.
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Though initially characterized by its creator as a legally "un-
disputed" proposition, 2 a claim unsupported even when it was made,
the Dillon Rule is now an anachronism. It sprang from a theory first
proffered by its namesake, Iowa Supreme Court Judge John Forest
Dillon," in Clark v. City of Des Moines.4 Judge Dillon later incorpo-
rated the Rule into his treatise on municipal corporations." Adopted
to address the problems of overreaching by local government leaders
in mid-nineteenth century America including issues such as corrup-
tion in dealings between the railroad industry and municipal corpo-
rations," the rule was viewed with increasing suspicion shortly after
its inception and is seen today as outdated and widely unpopular.'
7
As an alternative to following Dillon's Rule, almost every juris-
diction has adopted some form of the Home Rule." The Home Rule is
a more equitable separation of state and local power, which results
from the grant by state governments of varying degrees of power to
their municipalities. 9 These grants of power range from a state
merely enabling its municipalities to create a town charter (as in
Nebraska's illusory Home Rule2 ) to a broad grant of power allowing
municipalities to enact any legislation that does not directly conflict
with state legislation.2'
The Home Rule is thought to have first emerged in 1875 when
Missouri adopted a constitutional Home Rule provision.22 Similar
12. Id.
13. Glossary, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 493, 494.
14. 19 Iowa 199, 212 (1865).
15. See 1 DILLON, supra note 6, at 145.
16. E.g., City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 464-65 (1868).
17. Terrence P. Haas, Note, Constitutional Home Rule in Rhode Island, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMs U. L. REV. 677, 681 (2006) ("Not surprisingly, Dillon's Rule was viewed with
unhappy suspicion by local politicians and citizens who viewed the interference with local
decision-making as an invitation for distant state legislatures to pass self-serving regu-
lations."); G. Roth Kehoe II, Case Note, City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners:
The Louisiana Supreme Court Frees New Orleans from the Shackles of Dillon's Rule, 69
TUL. L. REv. 809, 813 (1995).
18. Introduction, supra note 5, at 14.
19. Richard Briffault posits that "[tihe home rule movement had two goals: to undo
Dillon's Rule by giving localities broad lawmaking authority and to provide local govern-
ments freedom from state interference in areas of local concern." Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I- The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10
(1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I- The Structure of Local Government
Law].
20. Krane, supra note 5, at 258.
21. Illinois is one example. See City of Urbana v. Houser, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ill.
1977) ("Home rule units thus have the same powers as the sovereign except where such
powers are limited by the General Assembly.").
22. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a); see Jill Welch, Local Government - Home Rule
Doctrine and State Preemption - The Iowa Supreme Court Resurrects Dillon's Rule and
Blurs the Line Between Implied Preemption and Inconsistency. Goodell v. Humboldt
County, 575 N. W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998), 30 RuTGERS L.J. 1548, 1550 (1999).
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regimes dividing local and state power are now prevalent across the
country.23 Even Iowa, the state from whose judiciary the Dillon Rule
emerged, no longer strictly interprets the Dillon Rule.24 Iowa now
uses a moderate version of the Home Rule.25 In 1978, Iowa passed
an amendment to its constitution that states:
A city may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution of the
State of Iowa, and if not inconsistent with the laws of the general
assembly, exercise any power and perform any function it deems
appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, privileges, and
property of the city or of its residents, and to preserve and im-
prove the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience
of its residents. 6
Virginia, however, still strictly interprets the Dillon Rule under
its judicial theory on the autonomy (or lack thereof) of municipal cor-
porations.27 Although other states purport to follow the Dillon Rule,
in practice they do so only to the extent that the Rule expresses pre-
eminence of the state when state law and local law conflict,28 which
is the default rule for state and local law conflicts even outside of the
Dillon Rule.29 Conversely, Virginia's use of the rule basically cripples
its municipal corporations by injecting uncertainty into the process
23. For a more thorough explanation of the history of the Home Rule in America, see
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I- The Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 19.
24. See City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 198 (Iowa 2006) (explain-
ing that with Iowa Constitution article III, section 38A, an amendment added in 1968,
Iowa gave municipalities Home Rule authority).
25. Paul Coates et al., Iowa, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 148, 150.
26. IOWA CODE § 364.1 (2007) (emphasis added).
27. See City Council of Alexandria v. Lindsey Trusts, 520 S.E.2d 181, 182 (Va. 1999)
("[The Dillon Rule] provides that municipal corporations have only those powers that are
expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and
those that are essential and indispensable. When a local ordinance exceeds the scope of
this authority, the ordinance is invalid." (citations omitted)).
28. See generally HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5 (discussing the various for-
mulations of the Home Rule on a state-by-state basis). Although, at one time, most of the
country followed the Dillon rule, a large majority of states have, to varying extent, adopted
the Home Rule, which provides that municipalities may enact laws that do not conflict
in any way with their state's laws. Glossary, supra note 13, at 495; Introduction, supra
note 5, at 9-12. For an example of application of the Dillon Rule primarily as a method
of resolving state and local law conflicts, see City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182,
188-89 (1923) (affirming the supremacy of state legislatures over local government in
holding that Trenton could not invoke the contract or Fourteenth Amendment provisions
of the federal Constitution against the imposition of the fee for the diversion of water),
and Iowa Code section 364.1 ("A city may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution
of the State of Iowa, and if not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, exercise
any power and perform any function it deems appropriate."(emphasis added)).
29. See Introduction, supra note 5, at 1.
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of enacting local legislation and by making local leaders reticent
to enact progressive measures lest they be challenged or overruled
outright.3"
Virginia's narrow interpretation of municipal authority prac-
tically renders its city and county governments ineffective." This
note will explore how the Dillon Rule, in combination with what has
historically been a very conservative state government, effectively
stymies the civil rights process in Virginia. Specifically, this note will
focus on the current debate in Virginia over gay rights in the case
of Bono v. Arlington Human Rights Commission." That Virginia law
has been hostile to gay rights is self-evident. The question is: does
the state's strict adherence to the Dillon Rule foster intolerance for
gay rights, or is the animus toward homosexuals already present
in Virginia and, therefore, feeding the continued allegiance of the
Commonwealth's judiciary to the Dillon Rule in specific opinions?
I. THE HISTORY OF THE DILLON RULE IN VIRGINIA
In Virginia, local governments can exercise only those powers
that are expressly granted to them by the state through the consti-
tution, general laws, special legislative acts, or charters.33 'This strict
application of Dillon's Rule is codified neither in the constitution nor
in the statutes but is acknowledged by the courts through statutory
30. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's Rule, 67 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1011, 1023-24 (1991) [hereinafter Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's
Rule].
[T]he [Dillon] Rule's lack of clarity results in inconsistent outcomes and
permits decisions based on the substantive biases of state judges rather than
on an informed appraisal of the proper scope of local power. Dillon's Rule
chills local autonomy in practice, by causing the invalidation of local mea-
sures and by inducing local residents (and local governments) to seek state
political solutions to local problems out of a concern that a local ordinance
might not withstand judicial scrutiny. And Dillon's Rule is hostile to local
autonomy in theory because it embodies a view of local governments as lim-
ited agents of the state rather than plenary representatives of local people.
Id.
31. See, e.g., Patrick J. Skelley II, Comment, Finding the Pearl in the Oyster: Strategies
for a More Effective Implementation of Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, 31
U. RICH. L. REV. 417, 433 (exploring how the Dillon Rule acts as an impediment to imple-
mentation of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act).
32. 72 Va. Cir. 256 (2006).
33. Examples of Virginia enabling legislation include section 36-106(c) of the Virginia
Code (passed in 2000), which authorizes Virginia municipalities to establish civil penalties
for violations of lead-based paint hazard Code provisions that are not immediately reme-
died by landlords, and article X, section 6 of the state constitution, which was amended
in 2007 by a ballot measure in a general election to authorize localities to provide partial
exemptions from real property taxes for real estate improvements in conservation, rede-
velopment, or rehabilitation areas.
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interpretation and by the customary usage of state and local offi-
cials."3 4 The Commonwealth legislature never enacted the Dillon
Rule; it is simply a common-law holdover from another time. 5 How-
ever, even though it has a strong tradition in the judiciary, Virginia's
restrictive viewpoint has not been universally popular with residents
or policymakers in Virginia.3"
Before the adoption of the current state constitution in 1971, the
Virginia Constitutional Revision Commission convened and completed
a report for the General Assembly.37 The council considered the views
of the citizen advisors to the "Local Government" subcommittee with
members from Richmond, Gloucester, Charlottesville, and Norfolk.38
The advisors recommended that the Assembly include in article VII,
Section 3 of the Virginia Constitution a clause giving to cities and
charter counties "all powers not denied them by the Constitution,
their charter, or laws enacted by the General Assembly."39
This language would have effectively overturned the Dillon
Rule.40 Had the state government signed the clause into law, barring
an explicit conflict with the Virginia Code, powers would be assumed
by Virginia's municipal governments instead of being reserved for
the Commonwealth. 41 The Commission explained that this measure
would have the effect of initially granting "broad powers to each local-
ity and leav[ing] it to the General Assembly to say whether decision-
making in a particular subject area should be on a statewide or local
basis."42 In this way, the Commonwealth could effectively police local
governments that became corrupt and, by narrowly tailoring their
restrictions in this effort, still allow municipalities to efficiently self-
govern until such time as their actions became harmful to citizens.
34. Keeok Park, Virginia, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 427, 428.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 433 ("[I]t is not surprising that many city and county officials, the Virginia
Municipal League, and the Virginia Association of Counties endorse the abolition of
Dillon's Rule and the establishment of home rule.").
37. COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION TO His EXCELLENCY, MILLS E. GODWIN,
JR., GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA AND THE PEOPLE OF
VIRGINIA, H. 1969-1, Extra Sess. (1969).
38. Id. at iii.
39. Id. at 229.
40. Id.
41. Similar language has been used in other state constitutions as a way of adopting
the Home Rule. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a).
42. COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION TO HIS EXCELLENCY, MILLS E. GODWIN,
JR., GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA AND THE PEOPLE OF
VIRGINIA, H. 1969-1, Extra Sess., at 229 (1969).
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'The General Assembly, however, declined to accept this
commission proposal and continues to reject similar constitutional
amendment proposals.""4 Its failure to amend the current state of
affairs is not entirely surprising, as the Dillon Rule gives the most
power possible to Virginia's General Assembly. And, because the
Assembly has clearly failed to amend it, the Supreme Court of
Virginia continues to enforce the Dillon Rule." It seems the Rule,
which sprang out of the concerns of a mid-nineteenth century Iowan
judge regarding corrupt railroad-building practices,45 will continue
to govern Virginia until it is expressly overturned by the General
Assembly.4"
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARLINGTON
Family Policy Network is working to organize a lawsuit on behalf
of a group of Arlington County business owners who feel the
"Human Rights Commission" poses a threat to their religious
liberties.... Please pray for this effort. Virginia localities must
not be allowed to force Christians to promote sin against their
will.47
The Virginia Code's Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, or dis-
ability." 4 The Code includes an additional provision that authorizes
localities to create their own human rights ordinances and local
human rights commissions.49 The local commissions are statutorily
granted with the "powers and duties"50 to
(1) Safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from
unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,
43. Park, supra note 34, at 428.
44. E.g., Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d. 706, 708 (Va. 2000).
45. See City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 464-69 (1868).
46. Presumably, any change of this doctrine would have to occur in the legislature,
as the current Supreme Court of Virginia has unwaveringly supported it. E.g., Bd. of
Supervisors of Augusta County v. Countryside Inv. Co., 522 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Va. 1999);
Ticonderoga Farms, Inc. v. County of Loudoun, 409 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Va. 1991).
47. Family Policy Network, Wanted: Christian Business Owners inArlington County,
VA, http://www.familypolicy.net/arlington (last visited Mar. 20,2008). This message was
posted following argument of Vincenz v. Bono Video, 72 Va. Cir. 256 (2006), before the
Human Rights Commission in a public hearing. The quote illustrates the emotional and
inaccurate portrayal by the Christian right of the issues in Bono.
48. Virginia Human Rights Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (2005).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-965 (2003).
50. Id.
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age, marital status, or disability, in places of public accommo-
dation, including educational institutions and in real estate
transactions; in employment; preserve the public safety, health
and general welfare; and further the interests, rights and
privileges of individuals within the Commonwealth; and
(2) Protect citizens of the Commonwealth against unfounded
charges of unlawful discrimination.5'
Under the authority of enabling legislation in the Virginia Code,52
Arlington has developed a comprehensive human rights ordinance.53
Arlington's ordinance includes provisions for nondiscriminatory treat-
ment in the housing, employment, credit, education, commercial real
estate, and public accommodations contexts.54 With the exception of
credit requirements, all of these protections are expressly cited in the
Virginia Human Rights Statute. 5
In fact, only three notable differences exist between the statutes.
First, the Arlington statute goes into much greater detail than the
Virginia statute in describing situations in which discrimination is
illegal.56 The second difference is that the Arlington statute uses the
phrase "familial status" 57 instead of the language used (presumably
to identify the same classification) by the Virginia statute: "pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions." 58 Finally, the most contro-
versial distinction is that the Arlington statute identifies "sexual
orientation" in its list of protected classifications.59
That the Virginia Code does not include a sexual orientation
provision in its antidiscrimination policy6 ° should come as no sur-
prise to those even casually acquainted with Virginia politics.6' This
51. Virginia Human Rights Act § 2.2-3900.
52. § 15.2-965.
53. See ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31 (2008).
54. Id. at ch. 31, § 31-3.
55. See § 15.2-965.
56. See ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-3 (2008). In line with the general
theory that local governments may provide more, but not fewer, rights for their citizens
than does the state, the Arlington Code describes particular discrimination offenses under
the topics covered in the state statute. See id. For example, in the housing context, the
Code specifically makes it illegal
To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise to make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, elder-
liness, marital status, familial status, religion, handicap or national origin.
Id. at 31-3(a)(1)(a).
57. Id.
58. Virginia Human Rights Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (2005).
59. ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-3 (2008).
60. Virginia Human Rights Act § 2.2-3900.
61. For more information about the codification of hostility toward gays in Virginia,
see the Equality Virginia website, which includes information on Virginia's sodomy laws,
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omission seems especially obvious in light of the 2006 passage of the
Marshall/Newman Amendment, which specifically disclaims all non-
marital relationships and relationships not between "one man and one
woman." 62 Interestingly, it is the Dillon Rule, and not the Marshall/
Newman Amendment, that effectively prohibits individual localities
in Virginia from legalizing gay marriage or civil unions because there
is no enabling legislation in the Virginia Code to support such a law."
The Virginia judiciary's adherence to the Dillon Rule would make it
impossible for any municipality to enact an ordinance recognizing
gay marriage, domestic partnership, or common law marriage.64
Because they have more politically liberal constituents than those
of the rural areas of Virginia, 5 municipal governments in Northern
Virginia are more likely to seek greater discretion in formulating local
policies. As a result, the progressive policies of areas like Arlington
have been at tension with Virginia state law under the Dillon Rule
for some time.66 In one example of this tension, Arlington County v.
the 2004 Affirmation of Marriage Act, and adoption barriers for gays in Virginia. Equality
Virginia, Amendment Watch: Issues in Virginia, http://www.equalityvirginia.org (follow
"The Issues in Virginia" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
62. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A.
63. Even before the passage of the Marshall/Newman Amendment, the Dillon Rule
would have foreclosed the possibility of a local government recognizing gay marriage be-
cause, not only did no provision of the Virginia Code authorize such action, a provision of
the code enacted in 1975 specifically voids same-sex marriage. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2
(2004) ("A marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered
into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all re-
spects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be void and
unenforceable.").
64. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d. 706, 708 (Va. 2000) (holding that
appellant county's coverage for domestic partners in its self-funded health benefit plan
for county employees violated the Dillon Rule).
The County's expanded definition of the word 'dependents' clearly and un-
equivocally violates the Dillon Rule ... [and] is nothing more than a dis-
guised effort to confer health benefits upon persons who are involved in either
common law marriages or same-sex unions, which are not recognized in this
Commonwealth and are violative of the public policy of this Commonwealth.
Id. at 713 (Hassell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).
65. Tim Craig, Senate's Blunt Majority Leader Walks a Tricky Path, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 2008, at VA04.
66. See White, 528 S.E.2d. at 708 (holding that appellant county's coverage for
domestic partners in its self-funded health benefit plan for county employees violated the
Dillon rule); Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d 30, 43-44 (Va.
1997) (holding that under the Dillon Rule, the county board's powers were limited to those
fixed by statute and, as such, it lacked authority to lease county-owned property to private
parties for retail and office use); Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington County Bd., 66 Va. Cir.
274, 283 (2004) (holding that the county's requirement that site plan applicants make
affordable housing contributions either by cash or by contributing affordable housing
units was illegal because the Virginia General Assembly had not granted the county the
authority to enact such guidelines).
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White, Arlington's policies on civil unions collided with Virginia's
adherence to the Dillon Rule.67
In White, Arlington residents sued for declaratory judgment that
Arlington's practice of extending its self-funded health insurance bene-
fits plan to unmarried domestic partners of its employees violated
the Dillon Rule.' The plaintiffs sought an injunction to keep Arlington
County from extending benefits to domestic partners, claiming that
they had standing to sue because extra funds required for such a
policy would cause them injury as municipal taxpayers.69
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the lower court's decision
for the plaintiffs on the grounds that the Arlington plan defined
"dependent" differently (and therefore without legal basis under the
Dillon Rule) than the interpretation of "dependent" as defined by the
Virginia Attorney General.7 ° Justice Hassell, in his dissenting opin-
ion, stated the conflict more forthrightly.71 His dissent was much less
politicized and addressed the issue that, at least he felt, the court was
actually deciding with their ruling: "I dissent because the majority
ignores the fundamental issue raised in this appeal: Does Arlington
County have the legal authority to recognize common law marriages
or 'same-sex unions' by conferring certain health insurance benefits
upon domestic partners of County employees who are engaged in
these relationships?" 72 Justice Hassell went on to answer that he be-
lieved Arlington County does not have the power to even peripherally
recognize any domestic partnership or civil union by granting health
benefits to unmarried partners of state workers.73 The Dillon Rule
was initially formulated to control corrupt municipal corporations,74
but Hassell's concern with what political statement the government
was making in overturning Arlington's ordinance (ostensibly dis-
approving of homosexuality) was far afield of that purpose.
67. 528 S.E.2d. at 708.
68. Id. at 707.
69. Id. at 707-08.
70. Id. at 708-09. The court cited 1997 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 131, 131-32 (1997) for the
proposition that "in the absence of any statutory authority indicating an intent to permit
a local governing body to extend health insurance coverage provided employees to persons
other than the spouse, children or dependants of the employee.., a county lacks the power
to provide such coverage." The reliance of the court on the Attorney General's opinion
is misplaced - the Dillon Rule supports the power of a state assembly, not merely the
opinion of a state official.
71. Id. at 710-11 (Hassell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 713.
74. Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 959, 964 (1991).
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State self-insured health benefit plans might logically fall under
the employment provision of Arlington's human rights ordinance.75
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, neglected to discuss this,
and thereby neglected to address the legality of including "sexual
orientation" as a protected classification in that ordinance in White."6
In fact, but for Justice Hassell's dissent, White might be consid-
ered, apart from a case about the controversial issue of gay rights
in Virginia, to belong to the set of cases establishing an economic
policy - that Arlington, as a more fiscally liberal entity than Virginia,
does not have the power under the Dillon Rule to provide extra bene-
fits for its residents.77
In formulating its human rights statute, Virginia established
that ensuring certain classes of people were protected against dis-
crimination in a wide variety of contexts was an important state
objective.78 In neglecting to include sexual orientation in the list of pro-
tected classes, the Commonwealth effectively denied homosexuals
the protection granted to other groups that were historically objects
of discrimination. 79 Virginia policy-makers thereby either purpose-
fully or unintentionally encouraged continued discrimination against
homosexuals within the borders of Virginia, in all contexts.
75. See ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-3(b)(1) (2008).
It shall be unlawful for any employer, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, handicap or age:... [t]o
deny an employee any opportunity with respect to hiring, promotion, tenure,
apprenticeship, compensation, terms, upgrading, training programs, or other
conditions, benefits or privileges of employment.
Id. (emphasis added). Following White, a state employee could bring a case claiming his
or her domestic partner should be covered on the state insurance plan and that in failing
to cover him or her, the state violated its own human rights statute. See Arlington County
v. White, 528 S.E.2d. 706, 708-09 (Va. 2000).
76. White, 528 S.E.2d at 708-09.
77. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. County Rd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d 30,43-44
(Va. 1977) (collective bargaining agreements made by a Virginia local government and
school board with labor unions were void because the power to make such agreements had
to be expressly given by statute and such power had never been conferred.); Kansas-Lincoln
L.C. v. Arlington County Bd., 66 Va. Cir. 274, 283 (2004) (holding that Arlington County
could not require applications to a General Land Use Plan site to make affordable hous-
ing contributions under the Dillon Rule because the Virginia General Assembly had not
granted the county the authority to require such mandatory contributions); see also U.S.
Patent Model Found. v. City of Alexandria, 40 Va. Cir. 48, 49 (1995) (holding that the
Human Rights Commission lacked authority to award back pay as a form of relief when
there was no adequate history of agency interpretation of the statutes giving the
Commission its powers).
78. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 2.2-3900 (2005).
79. See id.
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Arlington expressly included the classification."0 Considering
the hostility of Virginia towards gay rights and municipal activism"1
and Arlington's desire to protect its citizens from discrimination, as
evidenced by its thorough and inclusive human rights ordinance, 2
it was inevitable that this conflict would be addressed in the courts.
In White, the judiciary sidestepped the issue. But in a more recent
case, the Circuit Court of Arlington was presented with the question
of the legality of the county's human rights ordinance under the
Dillon Rule. 3
III. CASE STUDY: BONO V. ARLINGTON HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION8
4
When the ongoing conflict between the religious right and sup-
porters of civil rights for gays and lesbians clash in Virginia courts,
both sides must utilize legal definitions. Outside of the courtroom,
however, the debate is widely viewed by members of the two conflict-
ing groups, including the parties and their supporters, as an ideo-
logical struggle."8 As a result, the Dillon Rule, which was formulated
as a means of differentiating state and local powers, 6 has become, at
least in this context, a tool of religious conservatives to deny rights
to citizens of whom they do not approve.87 This method for the manip-
ulation of local laws by a minority contingent will remain effective
until Virginia rejects the Dillon Rule, which, as discussed above, is far
from imminent. The struggle for gay rights will not be the impetus for
such a change; Virginia has frequently attempted to remove what-
ever protections might be in place for gays and lesbians living in the
Commonwealth." In other words, Bono v. Arlington is not an anomaly.
80. ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-3 (2008).
81. See Equality Virginia, supra note 61.
82. See ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-3 (2008).
83. Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 256 (2006).
84. Id.
85. Both parties in Bono have discussed the case in terms of their respective ideologies.
See Annie Gowen, Gay Activist, Va. Firm Spar Over Protest Films: Christian Groups
Back Refusal to Make Copies, WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at B1 (identifying Tim Bono
and Lilli Vincenz as "a businessman ... with... Christian values" and a "gay activist,"
respectively). In the same article, Vincenz is quoted as saying, "[t]his struggle is dear to my
heart," and Bono referred to the video she wanted him to recreate as "run[ning] counter
to our Christian and ethical values."
86. See Gillette, supra note 74, at 961.
87. See Gowen, supra note 85 (quoting Joseph Price, general counsel for Equality
Virginia, as calling the case "another example of the effort to remove whatever protections
might be in place for gays and lesbians living in Virginia").
88. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; Gowen, supra note 85.
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In May of 2006, Arlington resident Lilli Vincenz asked Tim Bono,
who owns a production company in Arlington, to duplicate two videos
she shot in 1968 and 1970.89 Although he initially agreed to perform
this task, Bono refused when he discovered the video's titles, saying
that he felt such action would go against his Christian values and
align him with a "gay agenda." ' Ms. Vincenz then filed a complaint
with the Arlington Human Rights Commission, alleging that Bono
and Bono Video had violated the "public accommodations" provision
of the Arlington human rights ordinance by refusing to duplicate her
films because she was a lesbian.91 She alleged that Bono illegally dis-
criminated against her by denying her service based on a classification
protected by Arlington law - sexual orientation.92 She won her claim
in April 2006 after a public hearing.93
Mr. Bono was ordered to duplicate the films or pay the small cost
of their duplication.94 Obviously, this minor monetary cost was not
the primary reason for his involvement in this case. Additionally, it
seems that his central legal theory of the case - that the court should
restrict Arlington, as a Virginia municipality, from overstepping its
power in regulating its citizenry - was also not the driving force for
his involvement in the case.95 Instead, his primary motivations were
his belief that Arlington law should not prohibit discrimination
89. Gowen, supra note 85.
90. Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 256, 257 (2006).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 258; Press Release, Arlington County, Arlington County Human Rights
Commission Dismisses Discrimination Case Against Video Store Owner (June 10, 2006)
(available at http://www.arlingtonva.us/departmentscommunications/pressreleases/
5445.aspx).
94. Gowen, supra note 85.
95. The core legal issue of the case has been misrepresented by Bono's counsel in the
media in an effort to keep the plaintiffs sexual orientation at the forefront of the debate.
See id. For example, the Liberty Counsel quoted Erik Stanley, their chief counsel for Mr.
Bono, as stating: "Although we [Liberty Counsel and Tim Bono] are pleased the Com-
mission dismissed the frivolous complaint against Mr. Bono, we will continue to challenge
Arlington County's attempt to recognize 'sexual orientation' as a civil right." Press Release,
Liberty Counsel, Human Rights Commission Dismisses Complaint Against Christian
Businessman After Liberty Counsel Files Suit (June 13, 2006) (available at http://www
.lc.org/index.cfm?PID=14102&AlertID=205). This statement implies the Arlington Human
Rights Commission has, in enacting their anti-discrimination policy, made sexual activity
between homosexuals a civil right. In fact, sodomy between heterosexuals or homosexuals
is illegal in Virginia, and the Arlington ordinance does not even address sexual acts. VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (2007); ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-3(c)(1) (2008).
Instead, it makes sexual orientation, like race, a protected classification - a characteristic
on which providers of public accommodation, among others, may not predicate their refusal
to serve individuals.
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against homosexuals because he viewed homosexuality as a sin and
his intent to deny homosexuals service in the future.9 6
Mr. Bono filed a claim in Arlington Circuit Court for declaratory
judgment that the Arlington human rights legislation overstepped
the authority of Arlington County by including sexual orientation as
a protected classification, and thus violated the Dillon Rule.s Real-
izing what was at stake,98 the Arlington Human Rights Commission
reconsidered its judgment and dismissed the case the following June.'
The Commission explained its choice in a press release: "[i]n taking
[sic] its decision, the Human Rights Commission said that the Human
Rights Ordinance protects individuals from discrimination based on
sexual orientation, but does not prohibit discrimination based on the
content of materials."loo
The Commission emphasized that it reconsidered its decision on
the grounds that Mr. Bono's decision to refuse to reproduce the film
was based on his disapproval of the nature of the film, as he asserted
in his claim, and not based solely on the sexual orientation of Ms.
Vincenz.' °' No law requires him to reproduce material with which
he disagrees; the public accommodations clause requires only that
citizens not discriminate against individuals, but they may still
discriminate against material.'0 ' By refraining the issue in this way,
the Commission ensured that it did not foreclose opportunities for
other claimants to bring sexual orientation discrimination suits based
on similar public accommodations grounds. 103 The Commission's
revamped theory of the case limited only the scope of its "public
accommodations" clause and did not endanger the status of "sexual
orientation" as a protected classification under the ordinance."° This
analysis is arguably more rational than the Commission's initial
96. See Gowen, supra note 85.
97. Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 256, 256 (2006).
98. Bono put the entire sexual orientation provision of Arlington's anti-discrimination
policy in jeopardy. See id.
99. See Press Release, Arlington County, supra note 93.
100. Id.
101. Gowen, supra note 85. In the release, the Human Rights Commission was also
careful to note that the reconsideration did not arise merely because they were being chal-
lenged in court. See Press Release, Arlington County, supra note 93. But see Press Release,
Liberty Counsel, supra note 95.
102. See Press Release, Arlington County, supra note 93.
103. Had the Commission lost a case based on the legality of Arlington's classification
of "sexual orientation" as a protected characteristic, no suits could be brought against
people who discriminated in any of the arenas covered by the Arlington Human Rights
Ordinance, not just in the public accommodations context. See Gowen, supra note 85 (quot-
ing a state official saying if municipalities go against or beyond state enabling legislation
they risk having a court strike the entire ordinance).
104. Id.
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decision, that Mr. Bono violated the Arlington Human Rights
Ordinance. 10'5 When one considers that Ms. Vincenz's cause of action
was under the "public accommodations" clause of the human rights
ordinance,"0 6 her standing under the human rights statute is ex-
tremely questionable.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has never heard a case under
the "public accommodations" clause of Virginia's Human Rights
Statute,10 7 but to help predict what the outcome of such a case would
be, Virginia's "public accommodations" clause can be analogized to its
federal corollary: the section of the United States Code that prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations.108 Section 2000a was
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,109 amid concerns about
the effect of racist owners of hospitality services on interstate trans-
portation and commerce.' 10 Section 2000a offers broad protection for
individuals of traditionally persecuted groups from being denied ser-
vice in places like restaurants, motels, theaters, stadiums, and other
places that provide entertainment or hospitality services."' A busi-
ness that reproduces videos hardly falls into any of these categories,
and, therefore, would likely not be protected under the federal human
rights "public accommodations" clause.
The Arlington ordinance, however, has a much more expansive
definition of "public accommodations," in keeping with Arlington's
desire to protect the rights of groups that have often been the objects
of discrimination in the past.
Public accommodation shall mean and includes every business,
professional or commercial enterprise, hospital or nursing home,
place of lodging, refreshment, entertainment, sports, recreation
or transportation facility located in the county, whether licensed
or not, public or private, or transportation facility located in the
county, whether licensed or not, public or private, whose goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are
105. Press Release, Arlington County, supra note 93.
106. Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 256, 257-58 (2006).
107. Gowen, supra note 85 (quoting Arlington County attorney as saying the ordinance
has never before been tested in court).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
109. Id.
110. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to American People on
Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical
+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/OO3POFO3CivilRights
06111963.htm).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1-4) (2000).
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extended, offered, sold or otherwise made available in any manner
to the public.
112
Bono Video, as a commercial business that sells goods and services
to the public, certainly falls under this definition of "public accom-
modations."
The Arlington ordinance states that an owner of such a public
accommodation may not "discriminate against any person, on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status,
national origin, age or handicap." 3 A close examination of the facts
underlying Vincenz v. Bono Video makes it clear that at no point in
time did Tim Bono tell Lilli Vincenz that he would not allow her into
his store, nor did he state that he would not reproduce videos for her
under any circumstances." 4 He refused, specifically, to copy her videos
of gay rights protests, and only after he ascertained the nature of their
content from the titles."5 His actions constitute a refusal to perform
services not because of Ms. Vincenz's personal sexual orientation,
but rather on the basis of the content of the material to be repro-
duced, which is not a justiciable issue."6 As distasteful as his refusal
of public services based on an irrational prejudice may be, in this
form, it was not prohibited by law.
Even after the Human Rights Commission overturned their
earlier ruling, Bono continued to pursue his claim challenging the
Arlington human rights law." 7 This case, at first glance, seems to
be one of misinterpretation of a municipal ordinance. However, after
Bono instigated a suit for declaratory judgment, the legal issues be-
fore the court became potentially determinative of much more than
interpretation of the Arlington County ordinance."' Had the Arlington
Circuit Court ruled for Bono, as Virginia's adherence to the Dillon
112. ARLINGTON, VA., COUNTY CODE ch. 31, § 31-2(31) (2008) (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 256, 257 (2006).
115. Gowen, supra note 85.
116. Bono, 72 Va. Cir. at 259-60. In Bono, the court stated:
Because the Arlington Human Rights Commission reversed its decision it has,
in effect, taken no enforcement action against either Plaintiff, and, there-
fore, no actual case or controversy exists between the parties. In this case,
the mere threat that the Arlington Human Rights Commission might at some
future time pursue investigatory action against some resident or business
in Arlington County for content based sexual orientation discrimination is
too speculative and is not ripe for judicial action. Furthermore, all the parties
agree that the Arlington County Human Rights Ordinance does not allow
the County to prohibit content based discrimination.
Id.
117. Press Release, Liberty Counsel, supra note 95.
118. Bono, 72 Va. Cir. at 256.
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Rule suggested it would, store owners, employers, credit card com-
panies, educational institutions, and real estate brokers and agencies
would be legally allowed to discriminate on the basis of sexual orien-
tation. They could not only choose to discriminate against certain
"materials" or "ideologies," but also to refuse to provide services to
an entire category of people on a wholly arbitrary classification.
Bono could refuse to reproduce Lilli Vincenz's film of a family gath-
ering purely on the basis of her sexual orientation with no legal
repercussions.
The court did not decide this issue.119 Bono v. Arlington was
thrown out of court for a lack of standing.12 ° The Arlington Circuit
Court ruled that, because the Arlington Human Rights Commission
reversed their initial decision and took no further action against the
plaintiffs, "no actual case or controversy exists between the parties."12'
Significantly, the court neither explicitly nor implicitly endorsed
Arlington's human rights ordinance.'22 The decision states only that
the question of the ordinance's legality was not properly before the
court, and therefore would not be ruled on by the court.123 However,
the last sentences of the decision read:
To the extent that the Arlington County Human Rights
Commission is threatening enforcement of the Ordinance, without
the County Board's approval, then they are enjoined as it is out-
side the scope of Va. Code § 15.2-725 (2006).
We do not reach the issue of whether the Arlington County
Human Rights Commission has acted ultra vires and exceed[ed]
the scope of their authority under Dillon's Rule when investigat-
ing alleged incidents of sexual orientation discrimination.'24
This language suggests that the court would view any challenge to
the Arlington ordinance as directly implicating the Dillon Rule, which
would be a death knell for the antidiscrimination policy.
Bono leaves Arlington's antidiscrimination laws intact, but it
does so at the expense of the underlying claim. 125 The Arlington court
only found a lack of standing because the Arlington Human Rights
119. Id. at 260.
120. Id. at 259.
121. Id. This is an appropriate outcome, as a matter of law, but not entirely foreseeable,
considering the Virginia Supreme Court's finding of standing for Arlington citizens in
White. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d. 706, 707 (Va. 2000).
122. See Bono, 72 Va. Cir. at 259-60.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 260.
125. Id. at 259-60.
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Commission dropped their claim against the plaintiff.'26 Thus, Bono,
in conjunction with White, illustrates the Catch-22 faced by propo-
nents of civil rights for gays in Virginia. If a Virginia court hears a
case based on a municipality giving equal protection to homosexuals,
any protection Arlington gives will be overturned. 12 7 Government
agencies in Arlington can keep these policies intact, but they may
only be sure their policies and laws will stand by neglecting to en-
force them. Either way, the Dillon Rule precludes the advancement
of civil rights for gays in Virginia municipalities.
128
IV. THE DILLON RULE AND CIVIL RIGHTS STAGNATION IN VIRGINIA
As Bono illustrates, the Dillon Rule ties the hands of local govern-
ments who want to experiment and who understand the peculiarities
of their jurisdictions better than the state government. 129 Moreover,
political agendas often seem to motivate the Virginia Supreme Court's
strict adherence to the Dillon Rule. White is one example in which
the court's holding - that a municipal organization that self-insures
cannot even define "dependent" in its insurance policy without specific
authorization from the General Assembly13 0 - seems to be a holding
of false pretenses. Such a housekeeping measure as defining whom
the state may insure on its health plan would seem to be an indis-
pensable power of the locality, unless the court were to assert that
municipalities may do nothing at all without express enabling legis-
lation from the Virginia Code."'
l
126. Id. at 259.
127. See Gowen, supra note 85; Press Release, Liberty Counsel, supra note 95.
128. White, 528 S.E.2d at 713 (Hassell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (stating the General Assembly has not given Arlington authority to grant same sex
unions and any attempt would violate the public policy of Virginia).
129. See, e.g., Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's Rule, supra note 30,
at 1019. Briffault critiques Gillette's article, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can
Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, by saying that
Despite his commitment to local government in principle, Gillette's modern
public choice account of Dillon's Rule, by subjecting decisions enjoying local
majority support to intrusive judicial review, is in the end as antithetical to
local autonomy as the traditional justification of Dillon's Rule in terms of the
hierarchical inferiority of local governments.
Id. at 1019. Gillette posits that the Dillon Rule "can best be understood and justified as
a judicial check on local tendencies to cater to special interests at the expense of other
groups within the locality." Gillette, supra note 74, at 960. This supposition ignores the
fact that Dillon's Rule is more of a state check on local government than a judicial check
on anyone, and the fact that state officials are just as susceptible to special interests as
local government officials. Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's Rule, supra
note 30, at 1012, 1024. But see Gillette, supra note 74, at 960.
130. White, 528 S.E.2d. at 709.
131. The court has never made this assertion, and it never will, unless the General
Assembly decides it wants to oversee all minutiae of the administration of a locality.
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It seems much more likely, if also more cynical, that the decision
was motivated more by the personal biases of members of the court
than by a desire to limit the regulatory power of Virginia municipal-
ities, especially when one compares the holding of White with that
of City of Virginia Beach v. Hay.'32 In Hay, the Supreme Court of
Virginia stated:
Where the state legislature grants a local government the power
to do something but does not specifically direct the method of
implementing that power, the choice made by the local govern-
ment as to how to implement the conferred power will be upheld
as long as the method selected is reasonable."'
In the facts of both Hay and White, the Commonwealth had
granted power to municipalities via the Virginia Code for admin-
istrative tasks involving hiring and maintaining government em-
ployees."3 4 The Supreme Court of Virginia determined in Hay that
Virginia Beach was empowered to enact a code allowing the appoint-
ment of assistant city attorneys by city officials.'35 The decision rea-
soned that, because the "General Assembly created the department
of law and expressly authorized the city council to provide for assistant
city attorneys," and even though "the power to hire the employees
for the department of law is not expressly granted, it is fairly and
necessarily implied from these charter provisions."' 36
When considered alongside its decision in White, the decision of
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Hay seems as though it must have
come from a jurisdiction other than Virginia.'37 The court in White
Even in White, the Supreme Court of Virginia states that municipalities also have "powers
fairly or necessarily implied from expressly granted powers, and those powers which are
essential and indispensable." Id. at 708. The Court then comes to the preposterous con-
clusion that an act as necessary as defining "dependent" in a self-insured health benefit
policy does not fall into either of these categories. Id.
132. 518 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Va. 1999) (holding that, although under Dillon's Rule, appel-
lants were required to show that the method used to implement an express or implied
power was reasonable, appellants had lawfully enacted Virginia Beach, Va. Code § 2-166
allowing appellants to appoint assistant city attorneys as a reasonable method of imple-
menting appellant's power to hire).
133. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
134. White, 528 S.E.2d. at 708; Hay, 518 S.E.2d at 316.
135. Hay, 518 S.E.2d at 316.
136. Id.
137. The decision in Hay is incompatible with the Dillon Rule as it is applied in White.
See 1 DILLON, supra note 6, at 145. The Dillon Rule says that "[a]ny... reasonable
doubt.., is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied." Id.
at 145. In White, not even the ability to define the actual terms used in an express grant
of power is granted as "implied." White, 528 S.E.2d at 708. Hay, however, seems to state
that, in cases of doubt, the municipality is granted the power. Hay, 518 S.E.2d at 316.
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recognized that specific Virginia Code provisions allowed municipal-
ities to provide health insurance programs for their employees and
the dependents of their employees through a self-funded insurance
program. 13 8 It also acknowledged that no Virginia Code provision
defined "dependent." 139 Nonetheless, the court ruled that Arlington
did not have the power to include the domestic partners of its em-
ployees as "dependents" on its insurance plan. 140 These two cases,
when looked at together, leave municipalities with the somewhat
incongruous rule that they are allowed to decide what officials they
may appoint in order to effectively run their governments,1 4 1 but
they may not decide what benefits to give those appointees. 142
One possible explanation for the Court's erratic interpretations
of the Dillon Rule is that the actions of those municipalities ruled
against have incorporated political beliefs that are at odds with the
conservative beliefs embraced by a majority of Virginia's voters. 143
This theory seems especially likely in cases concerning gay rights.
The only case the Virginia Supreme Court has decided in which a
municipal ordinance granted rights to homosexuals and, in so doing,
implicated the Dillon Rule, was decided against the municipality. 14
V. VIRGINIA: THE LAST HOLDOUT?
At last count, though a few states purport to follow the Dillon
Rule, only one state other than Virginia follows the Dillon Rule as
strictly as Virginia. 145 Not all of these states are unreceptive to civil
rights. 146 However, Virginia is not the only state that uses the Dillon
Rule to deny civil rights to its citizens. 147
138. White, 528 S.E.2d. at 708.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Hay, 518 S.E.2d at 316.
142. White, 528 S.E.2d at 709.
143. See Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's Rule, supra note 30, at
1023-24 ("[T]he [Dillon] Rule's lack of clarity results in inconsistent outcomes and per-
mits decisions based on the substantive biases of state judges rather than on an informed
appraisal of the proper scope of local power.").
144. See White, 528 S.E.2d. at 709.
145. See Appendix: Home Rule in America, supra note 5, at 476-77; Introduction, supra
note 5, at 18-19; Krane, supra note 5, at 258.
146. Appendix: Home Rule in America, supra note 5, at 476-77 (charting states with
the Dillon Rule and those that have amended the rule).
147. Introduction, supra note 5, at 18-19 (stating Virginia is an example of why the
Home Rule should exist in all states and as an example of strict adherence to the Rule).
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Currently, seventeen states and the District of Columbia in-
clude sexual orientation as a protected classification in their anti-
discrimination policies.148 Included in this list is Nevada, which, like
Virginia, strictly follows the Dillon Rule. 4 9 Alabama, a state histori-
cally unresponsive to the gay rights movement,15 0 recently passed the
Sanctity of Marriage Amendment to its state constitution, which
explicitly disclaims same-sex relationships as unrecognized by the
state.15' North Carolina and West Virginia have similar laws.'52 The
gay rights situation in Nebraska is no better: a recent decision in the
Court of Appeals for the Eighht Circuit overturned a lower court to
find that Nebraska Constitution article I, section 29 (limiting state
recognized "marriage" to heterosexual couples) did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because laws that discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation only merit rational basis review. 153
148. These states include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia.
Center for Policy Alternatives, GLBT Anti-Discrimination, http://www.stateaction.org/
issues/issue.cfmlissue/GLBTAntiDiscrimination.xml (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
149. Appendix: Home Rule in America, supra note 5, at 476-77. Other states purporting
to follow the Dillon Rule are also receptive to the gay rights movement. Connecticut allows
gays to have "civil unions" that grant some state benefits. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38bb
(2007). In Idaho, a bill was introduced in the state senate in January 2008 that would make
discrimination against homosexuals illegal statewide. Phil Davidson, Bill Would Outlaw
Gay Discrimination, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Jan. 25, 2008, at Al.
150. See Equality Alabama, Issues: Marriage, available at http://www.equalityalabama
.org/informed/marriage.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
151. AIA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03 (2007). The drafters of this amendment, in a laudable
show of diligence, included provisions to the effect that "[n]o marriage license shall be
issued in the State of Alabama to parties of the same sex"; "[t]he State of Alabama shall
not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged
to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage
license was issued"; and that "[a] union ... between persons of the same sex in ...
Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall ... hav[e] no legal force or effect in this state and
shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or other union." Id.
152. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2007).
153. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859,863,871 (8th Cir. 2006). This case
was heard in federal court, and it must be noted that current jurisdictional differences in
gay rights standards would be resolved if the federal government would acknowledge that
gay rights are important and classify "sexual orientation" as a protected characteristic.
See id. at 871. No marriage amendment could pass in a state constitution if the Supreme
Court of the United States reviewed sexual orientation laws with the same scrutiny they
employ for race laws (strict scrutiny) or even gender laws (intermediate scrutiny). See,
e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (requiring "exceedingly pervasive
justification" by the government actor for gender classifications); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review for classifications based on race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (holding heightened scrutiny for gender is controlling in a case of discrimination
brought by a man). This result is highly unlikely, however, given the current makeup of
the Supreme Court. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court More Conservative, Fragmented
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Although all of these states have denied civil rights to homo-
sexuals through state laws and each has a power structure strongly
centered in their respective state governments, none appear to have
used the Dillon Rule to allow for the legal discrimination against
homosexuals in places of public accommodation. If Virginia is faced
with a ripe case addressing this question, the Commonwealth may
be the first state to do so. However, even the state "marriage" acts
of Alabama, North Carolina, West Virginia, and, of course Virginia,
effectively deny some civil rights to homosexuals by harnessing the
political rhetoric of the majority. In this respect, unfortunately,
Virginia is not unique.
With the current Supreme Court make-up and the prevalence
of religious rhetoric in current civil rights debates, gay legal rights
will likely not be achieved through the kind of landmark Supreme
Court decisions through which Americans of African descent won
their civil rights. Instead, this process will likely be a more piecemeal,
grassroots legislative battle fought in the states. However, the issue
being debated is now, as then, the struggle for rights by an histori-
cally persecuted and insular minority group.
To ensure that residents of distinct cities and localities may
democratically decide which rights to give and which groups should
be protected, all states should enact some form of the Home Rule. In
other states which allow municipalities more autonomy under one
or more Home Rule exceptions, policy-makers in local governments,
who have more of a personal connection with their individual con-
stituents than state law-makers, might be able to determine whether
including "sexual orientation" in their local anti-discrimination
policies is appropriate.
Minorities, including homosexuals, are at a disadvantage in
Virginia as a result of the Dillon Rule because, in such a conservative
state that has proved reluctant to change, it is unlikely that either:
(1) the state will enact legislation promoting minority rights or (2) the
state legislature will voluntarily lessen its power and abandon the
Dillon Rule." 4 Mindful of the majority whose votes will ensure their
next terms, state legislators rarely propose legislation promoting
minority rights, especially when the rights in question are as un-
popular as gay rights are in Virginia.'55 Although pockets of Virginia
(National Public Radio broadcast July 4,2006), available at http://www.npr.orgltemplates/
story/story.php?storyld=5531678. Thus, gay rights battles fought at the local level continue
to be of the utmost importance.
154. See Park, supra note 34, at 427 (citing Virginia as conservative and uncooperative
to change).
155. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d. 706, 713 (Va. 2000) (Hassell, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that gay relationships violate
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have constituencies who are relatively more friendly toward civil
rights, such as Arlington, the Dillon Rule renders them voiceless
against the conservative majority of the state. Therefore, all inno-
vative legislation must be approved by a majority of Virginia voters.
As the passage of the Marshall/Newman Amendment has shown, by
some not insignificant margin, Virginia voters do not support gay
rights." 6 As a result, Virginia state government politicians do not
support gay rights,"' and individual city constituencies may not be
able to vote to protect rights.
158
Virginia courts have implied that, if the disenfranchisement
perpetuated by the Dillon Rule is to be remedied, the legislature
should speak about it.' 59 It seems very unlikely, however, that a
disproportionately powerful state government will cede authority to
Commonwealth municipalities of its own volition. Simply because
the legislature does not support a local government authority policy
change (resulting from indifference on the subject by the voting pop-
ulation combined with the knowledge that such a decision would
decrease the legislature's power) does not mean that policy is not
ultimately the best for Virginia residents.
Moreover, if, in fact, the political conservative tendencies that
a majority of Virginia voters embrace influence the Virginia judiciary,
its adherence to the Dillon Rule not only fails to empower local gov-
ernments, but it also actually has the somewhat undemocratic effect
of strengthening the state government. 6 0 In this way, residents who
vote with the majority control all three branches of the government,
even the judiciary, which the constitutional framers created to safe-
guard the rights of the minority against the tyranny of the majority,
because of the common law Dillon Rule tradition. 6 '
Virginia public policy). A Westlaw search I conducted revealed that, of eight anti-
discrimination bills and orders that have been introduced in the Virginia legislature to
protect "sexual orientation" as a classification, all have died in committee except those
that were only introduced this year and are "committee referral pending."
156. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A.
157. At least, they do not support them past the introduction of bills. See sources cited
supra note 155 (Westlaw search).
158. See Gowen, supra note 85.
159. See Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (Va.
1977); U.S. Patent Model Found. v. City of Alexandria, 40 Va. Cir. 48, 49 (1995).
160. See Gillette, supra note 74, at 963.
161. Id. at 960-61. Both executives and state congresspersons are voted into office. If
the judiciary continues to cede all control to them, it renders the check on majority rule
ineffective. See id. at 966. This analysis does not even broach the topic of special interests,
which may again be able to control all three branches of government. Id. at 981-82. But
see Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's Rule, supra note 30, at 1019.
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CONCLUSION
A case this politically and legally controversial will certainly be
repeated. In the future, if the Arlington Human Rights Commission
attempts to charge a citizen with illegally discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation, it will certainly be sued for declaratory judg-
ment finding the law violates the Dillon Rule. If Arlington County v.
White is any indicator, that is, if the appellate court follows the prece-
dent of the Supreme Court of Virginia of allowing standing at a very
low threshold of injury in gay rights cases, standing will be estab-
lished and the anti-discrimination ordinance will ultimately be ruled
violative of the Dillon Rule.'62 This outcome seems even more likely
when one considers Virginia's allegiance to the Dillon Rule, described
above, and the hostility of Virginia citizens to statutory civil rights
provisions for gays, as evidenced by the passage of the Marshall/
Newman Amendment last year.163
If the Human Rights Commission in Arlington continues to en-
force the sexual orientation classification in the Arlington human
rights statute, the issue of whether the clause violates the Dillon Rule
will come up again.' If the Supreme Court of Virginia holds that
Arlington does not have the authority to protect its citizens from
162. Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d. 706, 707 (Va. 2000). In White, the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed summary judgment to appellee taxpayers who chal-
lenged Arlington's coverage of domestic partners under its "self-funded health insurance
benefits plan." Id. at 707, 709. Because the municipality provides these benefits, the
"direct and immediate" economic repercussions on taxpayers may be observable. Goldman
v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (Va. 2001). In effect, however, they are so diluted as to
render taxpayers incapable of establishing actual injury required to have standing under
the federal and state standards. See id. Goldman enunciated different standards for
citizens suing the local government (rather than the federal government) under taxpayer
standing:
For purposes of this standing inquiry, we treat the words 'citizen' and
'taxpayer' as being synonymous. We have addressed this type of standing
in various suits brought by taxpayers to restrain local, rather than state,
government officials from allegedly exceeding their powers in a manner that
would cause injury to the locality's taxpayers.
Id. It seems farfetched that the inclusion of domestic partners of government workers
on the city's self-funded health benefits plan would raise the taxes of individual taxpayers
such that it would "cause injury" to them. See id. at 72; White, 528 S.E.2d at 707. If the
court continues to strain the definition of "injury" in this way, perhaps Bono would be
considered to have established standing by virtue of being a taxpayer in a municipality
with ordinances that put a burden on his business.
163. See Chris L. Jenkins, Ban on Same-Sex Unions Added to Va. Constitution, WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A46.
164. Of course, an equal harm would result if the Human Rights Commission decided
not to pursue such claims when they occurred.
VIRGINIA IS FOR BUSINESS OWNERS
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, effects of such a
ruling would be widespread. Arlington would have to take the "sexual
orientation" language out of its human rights statute. Similar
language would be ruled illegal in other Commonwealth munici-
palities and in other state-run institutions, like public schools and
colleges. Such a decision would basically amount to a state-sanctioned
and -led policy of indifference to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, enabled by the anachronistic Dillon Rule.
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